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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
Even more dramatically, three of the latest members -Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia -were former republics of the Soviet Union.
This paper examines the process of NATO's role in Central and Eastern Europe. It reviews NATO's engagement with these states and analyzes the success of enlargement to date. It then addresses future prospects and U.S. national interests, to include continued engagement in the Balkans, Ukraine, the Caucasus and the former Soviet states in Central Asia, the question of further enlargement, and the question of U.S. and NATO relations with Russia. Particular focus is given to Ukraine and the Balkan states, those nations with the most reasonable prospects for eventual NATO membership.
BACKGROUND
While the sudden and dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the years immediately following may have created a general sense of euphoria in the region and beyond, there was no guarantee that these newly democratic, and in some cases newly independent, states would be successful. Even the most successful of them, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, have faced significant problems; others, such as Ukraine, have made far less progress and continue to struggle with major difficulties. Still others, such as Belarus, some of the former Soviet states in Central Asia, and initially Yugoslavia under Milosevic, failed completely, replacing Communism with a new form of autocracy or even totalitarianism.
Recognizing both the opportunity and the necessity to assist these states in their transformations, the United States and other western nations undertook a myriad of programs to aid the development of democracy and market economy in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, NATO as an institution also began a series of programs to assist these states, programs which have promoted a broad range of positive developments, including regional stability, democracy, military reform and even economic development. These series of programs have progressively increased the breadth and depth of cooperation between NATO and its member states and the states of Central and Eastern Europe, all the way to NATO membership.
In the early 1990s, NATO and its member states began rea ching out to the militaries of the new democracies to the east. 
THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE
Cooperation between NATO and the states of Central and Eastern Europe fostered increased security, and promoted political, military, economic and even social reform in the region. The ultimate goal for many CEE states, however, remained actual membership in the Alliance. Initially reluctant, by the mid-1990s officials at NATO and in its member capitals were seriously considering the possibility. In 1995, NATO itself conducted a study on possible enlargement. The study concluded that "enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all," and would strengthen and broaden the transatlantic partnership. It declared that enlargement would enhance stability and security "by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms ,… fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus-building, … and promoting good-neighborly relations." 8 In the study, NATO outlined the broad requirements that candidates would have to meet to qualify for membership. Requirements included a democratic political system, a demonstrated commitment to democratic control of the military, a market economy, respect for human rights, including minority rights, no border disputes with neighbors, the willingness to integrate with other members' forces, and the willingness and ability to contribute to the Alliance. The realistic possibility of NATO membership in turn spurred CEE states to increase their reform efforts, in an attempt to meet membership standards.
As NATO moved closer towards the decision to enlarge, there certainly was no consensus on the issue. During the mid and late 1990s, there was significant debate among politicians, policy makers, think tanks, academia, the media and the public over whether NATO should enlarge and, if so, which countries should be invited. At one extreme, some have even argued that, with the end of the Cold War, NATO has outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded. 9 At the other extreme were those who said the West needed to take advantage of Russia's momentary weakness by expanding swiftly into the former Soviet sphere of control, before the eventual resurgence of an aggressive Russia. 10 Between these two extremes were a range of arguments both for and against enlargement. Those in favor included a strengthened alliance, with increased military capabilities, new geostrategic territories, securing democratic gains in Central and Eastern Europe, expanding the zone of stability in Europe, and erasing the Cold War's dividing lines. 11 Opponents pointed to the lack of an external threat (and hence rationale for enlargement), the potential for diminished effectiveness (particularly in decision-making) and credibility, a perceived inability to defend new members and the financial cost. Of particular concern was the position of Russia, and the possibility that NATO enlargement could provoke a strong negative reaction from Moscow, perhaps even leading to a resurgence of the Cold War. was set for actual admittance -this would depend upon further reforms, as well as the requirement for many military adjustments necessary to achieve the minimum level of interoperability with NATO. Rather than resting on their laurels of reform successes to date, these states were prodded to redouble their efforts.
The near-unanimous interest of Central and Eastern European states in joining NATO
has provided a critical impetus for these countries to undertake the many political, economic, military and social reforms necessary to qualify for membership. They recognize that these reforms are in their own interest, regardless of NATO membership, but potential membership has provided an additional incentive. 13 Simeon Saxe-Coburg, the At the same time, an enlarged NATO has resulted in an expanded area of stability, which is in the interest of both the Alliance's old and new members. As stated by the U.S.
Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, accession of new members "reaffirms the importance of security as a condition for progress and prosperity." 24 Moving from a "gray zone" of stability to a place in the Alliance has enabled the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to further accelerate their political and economic transformation. 25 The same can be expected for the seven newest members.
THE FUTURE OF ENGAGEMENT
Although the number of CEE states now members of NATO is greater than the number of those that are not, NATO remains actively engaged with the non-member states. 
THE U.S. INTEREST
A stable, democratic and friendly Europe is a vital U.S. interest. NATO has proven itself a critical organization for protecting this interest. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) declares that NATO has, "since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security." 27 The NSS further states that, both to meet its core mission of collective defense and to carry out new missions in the post-September 11 world, NATO needs to expand its membership "to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests."
In June 2001 in Warsaw, President Bush declared that NATO membership should be
open to all European democracies that could meet the qualifications for membership. 28 As discussed above, an enlarged NATO has enhanced American security by helping increase the ranks of stable, democratic, market-oriented states. The attacks of September 11, however, have reinforced the need for a united front and a concerted, joint effort by the U.S. and its allies. "The case for enlargement… is stronger now than before. Enlargement will contribute to the process of integration that has helped stabilize Europe over the past fifty years and promote the development of strong new allies in the war on terrorism." 29 The former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, recently stated, "NATO has long been something more than the sum of its parts. Designed in part to transcend oldfashioned, balance-of-power politics within Europe, it has evolved over the years into a deeprooted institution with a commitment to democratic values and practices… along with [a] unique, integrated military structure." 30 As the fundamental institution for ensuring European and transatlantic security, a continued strong NATO remains in the U.S. interest.
Furthermore, the post-Cold War enlargement of NATO has promoted the expansion of security, stability and prosperity in Europe, and is creating a greater alliance for the U.S.-led War on Terror. Therefore, the U.S. should promote further NATO enlargement, and experience has shown that U.S. leadership will be crucial to the process.
A policy commitment to further enlargement does not suggest a rush to implementation, however. To maintain the capability, credibility and cohesion of the Alliance, no country should be invited or admitted to NATO before meeting the standards and criteria for membership. First and foremost, NATO "represents a community of common values and shared commitments to democracy, free markets and the rule of law." 31 Particularly given NATO's principle of consensus decision-making, it is essential that potential candidates show unequivocal commitment to these values before an invitation is extended. In addition, NATO requires that a potential member be able to contribute to the Alliance. New (and some old) members have shown that there are ways to contribute besides bringing large military forces to the table -even political support can at times be a contribution -but the need to contribute remains a requirement.
Finally, NATO and the United States should continue efforts to build closer relationships, through PFP, the EAPC and bilateral programs, with those states with no expectation of NATO membership. Closer relationships, and further political, economic and social reforms in those states, will promote regional stability and prosperity, even if they are not members of the Alliance. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA/SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO NATO membership for these two states remains a more distant prospect, as both states continue to suffer from a host of problems. That does not mean, however, that eventual NATO membership should not be an objective. Should these states ultimately reach the standards for NATO membership, it would make no sense to leave a NATO nonmembership hole in the Balkans. The goal, therefore, should be to continue the process of moving these states towards the point where they will be qualified. The available ways and means are essentially the same as those for the other Balkan candidates -although they will of course be smaller in scope and scale, given the lack of a MAP. As a first step, Bosnia and
THE PARTNER COUNTRIES
Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro should be assisted in their efforts to qualify for PFP.
At the Istanbul Summit, NATO stated that it is ready to admit both states into PFP, once they meet the conditions, and expressed readiness to assist. 33 Even if NATO membership remains a mid-to long-term prospect, assisting reform in these states, and integrating them into PFP, will promote regional stability and prosperity. An equally great challenge concerns Ukraine's own readiness for possible membership. In 2002, Ukraine declared that NATO membership was its ultimate objectivebut stopped short of formally requesting admittance. The rationale for stopping short, many assume, was a fear of being rebuffed. 35 Ukraine continues to suffer from shortcomings in its professed political and economic reform goals, shortcomings that have repeatedly drawn comments and criticism from the U.S. and other NATO allies. However, NATO's interests and those of Russia will likely never completely coincide. 46 At the same time, particularly in the wake of September 11, there are various issues on which NATO and Russia share interests, such as combating terrorism.
Recognizing that European (and by extension American) security ultimately is largely dependent upon maintaining at least non-confrontational relations with Russia, NATO has since the end of the Cold War sought to increase cooperation with its former adversary.
Russian objections to NATO enlargement in particular required an intensive dialogue to reduce tensions, and led in part to the conclusion in 1997 of the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russia. The Founding Act established the Permanent Joint Council, a body for consultations and coordination between NATO and Russia on a variety of issues of mutual interest. 47 At the time, this special relationship was unique between NATO and a Partner country, and reflected Russia's special importance.
As the relationship progressed, particularly after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the Permanent Joint Council was succeeded in 2002 by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).
The NRC strengthened the level of cooperation, and gave Russia a voice equal to individual NATO members in discussing and deciding on a wide range of issues (NATO of course reserves for itself alone responsibility over NATO core missions, such as defense of NATO territory, and decisions on NATO membership). Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, and Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, have stated that the NRC has transformed the relationship between NATO and Russia. 48 A strong NATO is in the U.S. national interest, as is an enlarged NATO. The U.S.
should support continued enlargement of NATO, conditioned on new members meeting all criteria for membership. These criteria will ensure NATO's continued capability, credibility and cohesion. Utilizing a full range of political, economic, military and informational resources, the U.S. and NATO should continue to work to assist prospective new members to meet the qualifications for membership. The process itself promotes the political, economic and social development of these countries, regardless of whether these states ultimately join NATO, and contributes to regional stability. Likewise, NATO and the U.S. need to continue the same efforts with those Partner states without the goal of NATO membership, for the same reasons.
Finally, NATO and Russia should continue their cooperation developed under the NATORussia Council, which in its first two years has already yielded concrete results benefiting the entire region.
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